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1. Introduction
In real life individuals face multiple risks that, often independently of
each other, can adversely affect their resources. Illness, theft,
unemployment, fires and floods, earthquakes, motor vehicle accidents and
changes in the prices of assets are among the many shocks that can deplete
individuals' endowments. Due to market incompleteness, however, only a
few of these risks can be insured against; the others must be borne in full. In
these circumstances it is likely that there will be spillover effects even
across independent risks: if what concerns individuals is their overall
exposure to uncertainty, they may cut the amount of avoidable risks to offset
unavoidable risks, such as that arising from shocks to human capital.
One possible consequence of independent background uncertainty - i.e.
uncertainty in the initial endowment - could be a reduction in holdings of
risky securities; another could be an increase in self-protection or the
purchase of more insurance against those risks that are insurable. Thus the
presence of background uncertainty can alter agents' risk-taking behavior,
inducing them to behave in a more risk-averse manner when faced with
other independent but avoidable risks. In spite of this obvious observation,
only very recently has the theoretical literature on insurance focused on
cases where uncertainty springs from more than one source.
1
Kimball (1993) and Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) show that if
preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion and prudence or if
temperance exceeds prudence (Gollier and Pratt, 1996), the addition of a
zero mean, uninsurable risk to initial wealth increases the demand for
insurance against insurable risks even if the two types of risk are
independent. The intuition is that independent risks are to some extent
substitutes, so that insuring one offers some attenuation of the others as
well. Elmendorf and Kimball (1991) and Duffie and Zariphopoulou (1993)
explore the implications of this proposition for the determinants of  portfolio
choices when labor income is uncertain and show that when agents face
1 Exceptions are Turnbull (1983) and Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a) who show that the
results of Mossin (1968) on optimal insurance do not generally hold when the insured is faced
with multiple risks and insurance markets are incomplete, and Doherty and Schlesinger
(1983b) who extend the analysis of deductible insurance to the case where initial wealth is
random. More recently Meyer (1992) and Dionne and Gollier (1992) have developed general
methods to study the effects of increases in risk on the level of the coinsurance rate when
there are multiple sources of risk, some insurable and some not. Their analysis is limited to
comparative static responses to changes in the probability distribution of the insurable loss.3
uninsurable risks they also reduce the demand for risky assets. Guiso,
Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996) find that this proposition is supported by
Italian cross-sectional data: the portfolio share of risky securities is
inversely related to proxies for income risk.
On the empirical side, few studies analyze the determinants of the
demand for insurance and none, to our knowledge, the effect of other
uninsurable risks on the insurance decision. In this paper we use Italian
cross-sectional data drawn from the 1989 Survey of Households Income and
Wealth (SHIW) to study the response of the consumer’s demand for
insurance to a subjective measure of earnings uncertainty, taken as a proxy
for background risk.
To clarify the effect of background risk on the demand for insurance,
Section 2 summarizes the effect of background risk on optimal insurance.
The data are set out in Section 3 and the empirical tests are presented in
Section 4. The findings suggest that the demand for insurance is positively
affected by background risk. The results are especially strong for insurance
decisions, weaker for insurance amounts. In the group with low expected
income variance the average predicted probability of purchasing insurance
is 13.2 percent; the probability increases to 19.6 percent for the group with
high expected income variance. We also find that the effect of income risk
on the demand for insurance falls with the level of households' resources.
2 Theory and model specification
2.1.  The standard insurance model
We illustrate the effect of background uncertainty on the demand for
insurance mainly drawing on recent theoretical findings. Consider a model
in which the household faces two independent risks. As in the classical
insurance model, one risk is insurable; but contrary to the classical model,
the other is not. Suppose that  ~ y =  y +e is the initial uncertain endowment
(i.e. the uninsurable background risk), where e is a zero mean disturbance
term with variance se
2. Let  p be the probability of an insurable loss of size L
and u( ) the utility of consumption. If the random  endowment is
independent of the insurable loss, the consumer optimization problem is4
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where denotes the full insurance premium and a the coinsurance rate, so that
aP is the total insurance premium. E denotes the expectation operator and
expectations are taken over  y ~. The first constraint states that the premium is
proportional to the expected value of the loss;  is the mark-up over the fair
insurance premium (the case =1).
2 The second constraint states that the
agent cannot «go short» on insurance. This problem is similar to the one
analyzed by Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992).
Letting  P = ` a , the optimization problem reduces to
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where ( ) / 1- ` m m p p is the net indemnity received by the consumer in the
event of a loss. To study the effect of background risk on the demand for
insurance consider first the case of no background risk, i.e.  y ~=y. Let  c `  be
the optimal level of insurance purchased when the endowment is certain, i.e.
the solution of the first order condition


















2  The mark-up may be due to transaction costs. Thus, a mark-up is not necessarily inconsistent
with competitive insurance markets. Italian casualty insurance companies generally set
premiums by  multiplying fair premiums by a mark-up to cover intermediation costs and
guarantee a «normal profit». For this reason we model a proportional mark-up.  However,
none of the main results of this section depend on this assumption.    5
Standard results in insurance theory imply that if the utility function is
concave, the consumer does not insure ( 0 = `c ) when the mark-up  exceeds
a given threshold m ; otherwise the problem has an interior solution
( 0 > `c ).
3 Further, if =1 the individual insures fully, independently of the
degree of absolute risk aversion; if instead >1, the amount of insurance
purchased increases with risk aversion.
2.2. The effect of background risk on insurance demand
The last result of paragraph 2.1 can be used to show that the introduction
of background risk can, under certain conditions, increase optimal
insurance. Let  ) ( ) ( e + = y Eu y v be the derived utility function obtained
integrating over , the random component of the initial endowment. Problem
(2) can then be written as
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which is formally equivalent to the problem in which the initial endowment
is certain. Let * be the solution of the first order condition when the initial
endowment is uncertain



















3  The condition for an interior solution is  ) ( '
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Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) show that if u() ￿  exhibits decreasing
absolute risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence, v() ￿ is strictly more
risk averse than u() ￿ , implying  c ` ‡ `* .
4 The inequality is strict if  0 > `c , or
if  0 = `c  and background risk is sufficiently large.
The effect of background risk on insurance demand is shown in Figure 1.
In each of the three panels, we denote as LL the marginal benefit from
raising coverage in the event of a loss (the left-hand side of equation 3), and
as NN the marginal cost from raising coverage in the event of no loss (the
right-hand side of 3). The shape of the curves reflects the assumption that
the individual is prudent, i.e. that marginal utility u'() ￿  is convex. In the
absence of background risk,  c `  is determined at the intersection of the two
curves.
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The first and the last terms are the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute risk aversion of the




the first inequality follows; the second inequality is an implication of decreasing absolute risk
aversion.7
denote, respectively, the level of resources in the two states when the
consumer insures optimally in the absence of background risk. Three cases
are possible, depending on the value of m .
If insurance is fair,  1 = m  and the consumer insures fully against the
insurable risk, i.e.  pL = `* . This implies  N L w w = , so that expected marginal
utility is Eu'( y - pL) in both states. Since the introduction of the background
risk raises expected marginal utility equally in both states, the two curves in
panel (a) of Figure 1 shift upwards by the same amount. Hence, the optimal
amount of insurance in the presence of background risk, *, is also
unchanged at pL. 5
If instead 1<
_
m , optimal insurance when the endowment is certain
provides only partial coverage (0< c ` <pL). Thus, the total amount of
resources in the loss state, wL, is smaller than in the no-loss state,  N w . The
two curves shift again upwards in response to background risk (panel b).
However, if preferences display decreasing absolute risk aversion and
decreasing absolute prudence, background risk raises expected marginal
utility in the loss state proportionally more than in the no-loss state. Hence,
the shift of the LL curve exceeds that of the NN curve and  * increases.
6
Finally, panel (c) shows that if  exceeds the threshold  m ‡  (defined in
footnote 3) the optimal level of insurance is negative; but given the no
«short sales» constraint,  no insurance is initially purchased. Since the
introduction of background risk raises m , it also raises the possibility that
the insurance will be purchased, for the same reason as in the previous case.
Note that the consumer switches to insurance purchase only if background
risk is sufficiently large.
5 If m =  1 full insurance is optimal even if the initial endowment is random but independent of
the insurable risk. In fact, from equation (5)  ) - ( '   =   )   )
-
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 for all i, implying  pL = ` . For   pL > ` , the left-hand side of
the above condition is smaller than the right-hand side (larger if  pL < ` ).
6  Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a) show that if  1 > m  partial coverage is optimal even if the
two risks are negatively correlated, although it is not necessarily invariant to the degree of
correlation or to the level of background risk.8
To summarize, if insurance is offered at unfair terms and preferences
display decreasing risk aversion and decreasing prudence the introduction of
an independent, zero mean, uninsurable risk increases the demand for
insurance against the insurable risk. The intuition is that adding an
independent risk increases the expected marginal benefit from raising
coverage conditional on "bad" realizations of the insurable risk relatively to
the marginal cost conditional on "good" realizations. This, in turn, increases
the probability of purchasing insurance against the insurable risk and the
amount of insurance purchased. One can also show that if risk aversion and
prudence are sufficiently convex, the effect of background risk on insurance
demand falls with the level of the certain endowment.
7 This places
additional restrictions on preferences: assuming decreasing prudence, a
necessary condition for prudence to be convex is that the degree of absolute
temperance, as defined by Kimball (1992), falls with y.
8 This implies that
the effect of endowment risk on insurance is likely to depend on the level of
resources.
2.3 Extensions
We have discussed the effect of background risk on insurance demand
starting from a situation where none is present. However, adding a zero
mean independent risk to a risky endowment also increases *.  This only
requires defining  ) ( y u as a derived utility function obtained integrating with
7  A proof is available upon request. Gollier and Pratt (1996) argue that the convexity of
absolute risk aversion should be regarded as a natural assumption, «.. since it means that the
wealthier an agent is, the smaller the reduction in risk premium following an increase in
wealth». On the same grounds, convexity of absolute prudence should also be viewed as a
natural property of preferences. In fact, this implies that the precautionary premium of a given
risk falls with wealth. Kimball (1992) provides intuitive arguments in favor of decreasing
absolute prudence.
8  Let  ) ( ' ' ' / ) ( ' ' ' ' ) ( y u y u y T - =  denote the degree of absolute temperance,
) ( ' ' / ) ( ' ' ' ) ( y u y u y P - =  the degree of absolute prudence and   ) ( ' / ) ( ' ' ) ( y u y u y R - =
the degree of absolute risk aversion. The convexity of  P( ) ￿  requires that
T P P T P Q / 2 ) /( ) ( > - - , where  T u u Q > - = ' ' ' ' / ' ' ' ' '  if temperance is decreasing
and  P T >  if prudence is decreasing. Convexity of absolute risk aversion requires that a
similar condition holds,  i.e. P R R P R T / 2 ) /( ) ( > - - , where  R P >   if absolute risk
aversion is decreasing.9
respect to a zero-mean shock, , to the initial endowment, y. Using the same
argument as in footnote 4, the addition of a zero mean independent risk, , to
the risky endowment,  y + , increases the insurance premium if prudence and
absolute risk aversion are decreasing. 9
Decreasing absolute risk aversion and prudence are sufficient for
individuals to become more risk averse when confronted with an increase in
background risk. The condition that absolute prudence is decreasing can be
weakened. Gollier and Pratt (1996) elaborate on the notion of "proper risk
aversion" (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987) and establish necessary and
sufficient conditions under which adding a small, unfair, independent risk to
wealth induces more risk-averse behavior. This requires that absolute
temperance,  ) ( ' ' ' / ) ( ' ' ' ' ) ( ￿ ￿ - = ￿ u u T , exceed absolute risk aversion, a weaker
condition than decreasing prudence.
10
The comparative static of increased background risk is further
generalized by Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996), who extend the
analysis to general first and second order dominance shifts in background
risk. Since they look at unrestricted second-order stochastic dominance
shifts, the conditions on preferences that are required  for these shifts in
background risk to generate more risk averse behavior are also stronger.
So far we have assumed that background risk is independent of the
insurable loss. This may not always be the case; for instance, poor health
will normally be associated with a reduction in working ability and the
efficiency of human capital.
11 Similarly, damages to equipment and
machinery, caused for instance by a flood, may stop self-employed activity
and worsen the distribution of the initial endowment. In both cases the
insurable and the uninsurable risk are linked by a positive relationship.
Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) show that in these circumstances
background risk has a stronger positive impact on the demand for insurance
9 This result holds under the weaker condition  0 ) ~ ( = y E e  for all  y.
10  Decreasing prudence requires that temperance be larger than prudence which, in turn, is larger
than risk aversion if risk aversion is decreasing. Thus, the condition specified by Gollier and
Pratt (1996) may hold even if temperance is lower than prudence. An equivalent condition is
set out by Franke, Stapleton and  Subrahmanyan (1995).
11 This will clearly be the case in the absence of protections against falls in earnings due to poor
health. In Italy, the earnings of employees are essentially unaffected by temporary shocks to
health because workers receive up to 12 months of full pay in case of illness.10
both because of decreasing prudence and because of the positive
dependence between the two risks.
12
2.4. Model specification
Assuming that background risk,  y ~, can be approximated by its certain
component, y, and its variance, s2, the solution to the maximization
problem (1) takes the form:
0. )   ,   ,   , ( i i i i i p L y m s
2 * , ` = ` (6)
where i (i=1, ... N) indexes the households in the sample. Clearly,  * `  is an
increasing function of the size of the loss L; it increases with p if the
elasticity of the coinsurance rate a with respect to p is greater than 1; it falls
with m if the elasticity of a with respect to m  is smaller than 1.
The loss L is not directly observable but is strongly correlated with the
level of individual resources, y. This implies that the effect of an increase in
the certain component of resources on  * `  is, a priori, ambiguous:
decreasing risk aversion implies that insurance falls with wealth, but an
increase in wealth also raises the demand for insurance if the (unobservable)
loss is positively correlated with the level of resources.
13
Our previous discussion suggests that 
2 / * i ¶s ¶`  > 0. We also argue that
this derivative is likely to fall with wealth if prudence and risk aversion are
sufficiently convex in wealth, thus  0 ) / * (




. In the following
section we seek empirical support for these two theoretical claims, i.e. that
insurance demand is positively correlated with income risk and that this
correlation falls with wealth.
12  To define a positive relationship between the insurable loss and the uninsurable risk Eeckhoudt
and Kimball (1992) assume that the distribution of background risk conditional upon a given level
of the insurable loss deteriorates in the sense of third-order stochastic dominance.
13  Mayers and Smith (1983) show that in a model of simultaneous portfolio and insurance
choices, an  increase in endowment wealth may increase the demand for insurance.11
3. Casualty insurance and income risk
Despite the growth of the theoretical literature, few empirical studies
analyze the determinants of the demand for insurance and none, to our
knowledge, the effect of other, uninsurable risks on the insurance decision.
14
Clearly, this issue can be analyzed only in a sample that allows individual
heterogeneity with respect to risk, i.e. with microeconomic data on
households. For this purpose, we use a representative sample of Italian
households which contains information on casualty insurance, households’
resources and income uncertainty.
15
There are at least two reasons for focusing on casualty insurance, rather
than on health and life insurance, the other two most popular insurance
contracts.  Contributions paid to life insurance represent a mixture of a pure
premium against the risk of premature death and of saving in a particular
financial instrument; empirically, the premium is not distinguishable. In the
Italian health insurance market there is substantial government intervention.
In fact, to a very large extent health insurance is provided by the National
Health Service, which imposes a flat contribution tax rate, offers universal
coverage and insures most health risks for any amount. Since those who do
not purchase health insurance can count on public health care, the demand
for health insurance depends crucially on the quality of the public service (in
addition to individual health risk). No such problems arise in the context of
casualty insurance, where no public network exists and premiums truly
reflect the price of risk avoidance. In fact we define casualty insurance as
premiums paid to insure against the risk of property damages, fire and theft,
and purposely exclude car insurance, which consists in part of compulsory
liability coverage.
14  Even empirical research on liability insurance, which is our focus, is scarce. One exception is
Szpiro (1986) who provides estimates of the demand for liability insurance but using aggregate
data. Lewis (1989) uses household level data to analyze the demand for life insurance. All these
studies neglect the presence of background risk; if this is an important determinant of the demand
for insurance, omitting it may result in biased parameter estimates.
15 The use of household-level data to study individual preferences can be problematic. One
possibility is to assume that individuals within the household have identical preferences but
differ in their wealth holdings, so that the behavior of one of the members at low wealth can
be compared to that of another member at higher wealth. Alternatively, one can assume that
individual preferences are represented by those of the household head.12
In our sample, about 10 percent of the households report spending on
casualty insurance as defined above. Insurance holders are mostly
homeowners but very few have a mortgage (3.5 and 3.9 percent in the
groups without casualty insurance and with insurance, respectively) This
implies that the decision to insure is not due to mortgage market
regulation.
16 Large loading rates in the Italian insurance industry are likely
to explain why relatively few households buy insurance (as shown in
Section 2, if the load factor is sufficiently high, the optimal decision is to
purchase no insurance). A rough estimate of the spread between actual and
fair insurance is the ratio between premiums for casualty insurance paid to
insurance companies and indemnities paid by insurance companies. This
measure reflects both the presence of transaction costs and departures from
perfect competition;  in the Italian insurance market between 1988 and 1992
the ratio is as high as 1.25.
17
Other evidence that the spreads between fair and actual premiums are
large comes from international comparisons. In Italy the cost of insuring a
property whose value is 90,000 ECU (including furnishings and belongings)
against fire and theft was 370 ECU in 1991, the highest within the European
Community (Gerardi, 1994).
18 The tax code also discourages insurance
purchases: in some cases losses can be deducted from income (for instance,
for small business or farmers), but premiums cannot.
The 1989 SHIW provides data on income, financial and real wealth and
demographic variables for a representative sample of 8,274 Italian
households. Balance-sheet items are reported as of 31 December of the
reference year; income and flow variables refer to the calendar year itself.
The main features of the SHIW, its sample design, interviewing procedures
and response rates are described by Brandolini and Cannari (1994).
A special section of the survey is designed to elicit information about the
probability distribution of earnings and inflation prospects. The alternative
to collecting subjective income expectations is to infer expectations from
income realizations (typically in panel data). We do not find this alternative
convincing, mainly because it assumes that the econometrician knows the
agent’s information set and how he uses it to form expectations. Subjective
16  Excluding households with mortgage loans does not affect our results.
17  Source: Statistical Yearbook of ANIA (Association of Insurance Companies),  Rome 1993,
Table 6.
18  The EC average is 207 ECU, and the lowest value is 118 ECU in Belgium.13
income information can be collected in various ways. For instance,
Dominitz and Manski (1994) use the Survey of Consumer Expectations to
construct a measure of subjective income uncertainty for 437 US
households. Their questions refer to the cumulative distribution function of
earnings, rather than the density function, as described below.
19
In the 1989 SHIW each labor income or pension recipient is asked to
attribute probability weights, summing to 100, to given intervals of inflation
and nominal income increases one year ahead (the wording of the questions
is reported in the Appendix). To construct a proxy for the subjective
variance of real income, let z ~denote the perceived growth rate of nominal
labor and pension income, p ~ the perceived rate of inflation and  ~ x  the
perceived rate of growth of real income, so that  p ~ ~ ~ - = z x . The variance of
the random variable x ~ is then  p p s rs s s s z z x 2
2 2 2 - + = , where  is the
correlation coefficient between shocks to nominal income and inflation.
Since next-period expected real income is   ) ~ 1 ( ~
1 x y y t t + = + , its conditional
variance is 
2 2 2
t x y s s = .
We observe the marginal distributions of perceived nominal income
growth and inflation (which can be used to compute z s  and  p s ) but not the
correlation coefficient . There are two ways to estimate the variance of real
income growth. One way is to assume a certain value for ; in particular, we
assume =-1, the value of  that maximizes the expected variance.
Alternatively, one can search over the range of admissible values for  and
maximize the likelihood function by grid search. Empirically, the two
strategies lead to very similar results, so only the former is reported in
Section 4.
20
Our proxy for uncertainty is subject to several critiques. Given the
wording of the questions, the probability of a very low-income state, such as
unemployment, may not be reported. The variance is a valid indicator of risk
only under restrictive assumptions. In a general setting, the demand for
insurance depends on lifetime income uncertainty, rather than on uncertainty
one or several periods ahead. As mentioned, however, we find alternative
measures of income risk even more questionable. Measures of uncertainty
19 Morgan and Henzion (1990) discuss the relative advantages of different procedures for
eliciting subjective probability distributions.
20  The reason is that the likelihood function is rather flat over the entire range of the admissible
values of .14
constructed from income realizations require very strong assumptions about
the individual’s information set. And proxies for income risk based on
occupation may capture labor supply effects that have little to do with risk.
Furthermore, in previous work we have found that the subjective variance is
a useful indicator of income risk. Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992,
1996) find that subjective variance is positively related to asset
accumulation and that households expecting more volatile incomes hold a
smaller share of risky assets. Lusardi (1993), using the same proxy, also
finds evidence in favor of a precautionary motive for asset accumulation.
21
Due to missing data about inflation and income expectations, the sample
is restricted to 4,078 households. Sample selection bias arises if non-
responses are not randomly distributed in the population. The first column
of Table 1 reports averages of the variables that will be used in the
estimation for the entire SHIW sample (8,274 households). The latter
includes a slightly lower proportion of young, married households with less
education than our selected sample (see column 2). The estimate of
households’ resources (net wealth plus disposable income) is 10 percent
higher in the selected sample. The proportion holding insurance and the
amounts held are also larger in column 2. Overall, the relatively small
differences between the total and the selected sample suggest that non-
responses should not affect greatly the estimated coefficients.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 report sample means for the group of
households holding no insurance and for insurance holders. In the selected
sample the fraction of households subscribing to casualty insurance is 13
percent; for this group annual premiums average 3 percent of disposable
income. Insurance holders are younger, better educated, richer and more
likely to live in the North and in larger cities than those who do not hold
insurance. The fraction of the self-employed is larger in the group buying
insurance, (0.31 against 0.20).
22
Households with insurance expect their incomes to be substantially more
volatile than those without: the average income variance is 0.51 million lire
in the group without insurance vis-à-vis a variance of 1.05 million lire for
those buying casualty insurance. This is not a result of the variance being
21 She also finds that workers who spent more time with the same employer tend to report lower
income uncertainty, and interprets this as evidence of implicit insurance offered to workers by
their employers.
22 As will be seen in the next section, the effect of self-employment on the demand for insurance
is difficult to interpret.15
larger for richer households: the coefficient of variation of expected
earnings is 1.4 percent in the sub-sample without insurance, against 2
percent among insurance holders. The descriptive evidence suggests that our
proxy for income risk is strongly correlated with the insurance decision.
However, a proper test of the proposition that background risk raises the
demand for insurance requires that all variables affecting the latter are held
constant and that account is taken of the sources of potential selection bias.
4. Empirical results
The model developed in Section 2 suggests that both the decision to
insure and the amount of insurance depend on preferences, the probability of
the loss, the terms of the insurance contract, the level and riskiness of
household’s endowment (see equation 6). We proxy unobservable
preferences with a set of demographic characteristics (age, marital status
and education of the household head, number of children under 18). The
terms at which insurance is offered and the probability of a loss are also
unobservable, but are likely to vary geographically; accordingly we
introduce a set of regional dummies and city size indicators in the
regressions. The level of the household’s non-stochastic endowment is
measured by total household resources defined as beginning-of-period net
worth (real assets, financial assets and durable goods) plus disposable
income.
23 We also introduce a dummy for self-employment (including
professionals); a priori, the sign of this coefficient is ambiguous and will be
discussed below.
Since the theoretical focus is on the effect of a mean-preserving spread in
background risk on insurance demand, it is important that we control for the
expected value of future uninsurable resources; accordingly, we introduce
the expected value of earnings as a separate regressor.
24 As we argue in
23 Beginning-of-period net worth is computed by subtracting 1989 savings from 1989 end-of-
period net worth  (see the Appendix  for  the definition of net worth).
24 We rely again on the subjective probability distribution of future income to construct this
variable. We estimate expected future real earnings multiplying 1989 earnings by
( ) 1+ - x p , the expected real income growth, where x and  are the expected values of the
random variables  ~ x and ~ p  respectively. This procedure is therefore fully consistent with the
construction of the expected variance of earnings.16
Section 2, the effect of income risk on the demand for insurance may vary
with households' resources. To capture this effect we interact the subjective
variance with current resources: the coefficient should be negative if
absolute prudence and risk aversion are sufficiently convex.
We have no direct information on the size of the insurable loss and its
riskiness. Yet the demand for insurance depends also on these variables.
Furthermore, their omission might affect the interpretation of the effect of
income risk: if the variance of income is simply proxying for omitted
property risk (as would be the case if income and property risk were
positively correlated), a positive effect of income variance on casualty
insurance might reflect the fact that the demand for insurance depends on
the variance of the insurable loss, rather than a genuine preference effect
(reacting to uninsurable risks by raising coverage against risks that are
insurable).
25
Our measure of uncertainty would correctly reflect the effect of
background risk on insurance only if earnings risk and property risk were
uncorrelated. This may be a strong assumption. For instance, theft and fire
may reduce the income of a self-employed person, suggesting a positive
correlation between the insurable shocks to property and the uninsurable
background risk. Our strategy for tackling this identification problem is
twofold. First, we try to control explicitly for insurable risks to the
individuals’ property by proxying them with the value of home furnishings,
appliances and valuables. When introduced into the regressions, however,
the coefficients of these separate stocks of durable goods are not
significantly different from zero, perhaps because they are already included
as a component of household resources. Second, we focus on employees
only: for this group the assumption of independence between income risk
and property risk is certainly less questionable.
We have also experimented with a larger set of variables. The marginal
tax rate may affect the demand for insurance negatively, given that tax
25  The effect on the demand for insurance of a mean-preserving increase in the riskiness of the
insurable loss is far from trivial. As mentioned in footnote 1, Meyer (1992) analyzes this
problem when the initial endowment is random. He establishes sufficient conditions under
which a constant-mean increase in the riskiness of the insurable loss leads to an increase in
insurance. Under independence of the insurable and the uninsurable risks, the conditions
include that utility exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion, that relative risk aversion is
non-decreasing and that it is does not exceed 1.17
deductions increase at high levels of income.
26 The variance is only a partial
representation of risk: households may react more strongly to negative
income shocks than to positive ones. We thus construct a dummy indicating
households with higher than average variance who expect large negative
changes in real earnings (a drop of at least 5 percent). The coefficients of
these variables, however, were not significantly different from zero, and are
dropped from the final specification.
27
First we analyze the insurance decision per se, then turn our attention to
insurance amounts. In Table 2 we report the probit estimates of the demand
for casualty insurance.
28 We also report the marginal effects of each
variable. The probability of buying insurance depends positively on
education and on number of children, and is lower for residents in the South
and in small cities. The probability is a concave function of age, reaching a
maximum at age 48. Household resources, expected future earnings and the
expected variance of earnings increase the probability of purchasing
insurance.
It is useful to evaluate the average predicted probability for varying
levels of resources. For the 1,736 households with resources between 100
and 200 million lire the average probability is 9.1 percent; for the 1,137
households with resources between 200 and 300 million it is 13.2 percent;
for those with resources between 300 and 400 million (478 households) it is
18.0 percent.
29 The fact that the probability of purchasing insurance rises
with household resources is not necessarily inconsistent with decreasing
26 The marginal tax rate is estimated for each single income recipient by a simulation model; we
thank Dino Rizzi for providing us with the data.
27 We also check the robustness of the results using a qualitative variable available in the 1989
SHIW. Each pension or labor income recipient was asked if he or she expected income to be
volatile - "may go up or down considerably in the next five years", or stable "may go up or
down somewhat or is expected to be stable in the next five years." For brevity these results are
not reported. The dummy is positive and significantly different from zero in the probit
estimates; in the amount equation the dummy is again positive but imprecisely estimated. The
number of days ill in 1989, proxying for health hazards, was also added to the regressors, and
dropped because not significantly different from zero.
28  For comparison with the probit estimates, we also estimate a linear probability model. The
latter is a consistent estimator but is less efficient than the probit if the errors are normally
distributed; however, it is robust with respect to departures from normality. The results of the
linear probability model are qualitatively similar to those of the probit, but the standard errors
are larger. For brevity, these regressions are not reported.
29  Evaluated at sample means, raising resources from 100 to 500 million lire increases the
probability by 8.8 percentage points.18
absolute risk aversion. As noted, if the endowment is correlated with
potential losses, there could be a positive correlation between insurance
purchases and wealth even under decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Income risk is an important factor in explaining the decision to purchase
insurance. The coefficient of the expected variance of earnings is positive
and significantly different from zero. The marginal effect is also positive,
even taking into account the negative interaction term. In the group with
relatively low variance (between 1 and 2 million lire), the average predicted
probability is 13.2 percent; the probability increases to 19.4 percent for the
group with expected variance between 2 and 5 million. Evaluated at sample
means, the probability increases by 4.3 percentage points if the expected
variance is increased from 1 to 10 million lire (the 95th percentile of the
distribution of the expected variance).
The sign of the interaction term between the variance of income and the
value of resources is negative. For relatively poor households (resources of
100 million lire), an increase in the variance of income from 1 to 10 million
lire increases the probability of purchasing insurance by 5.7 points; for rich
households (resources of 500 million) the same increase in the variance
increases the probability by 0.8 points. As mentioned, the fact that the effect
of income risk on the demand for insurance falls with wealth is consistent
with convex  prudence and risk aversion.
Switching to self-employment increases the probability of purchasing
casualty insurance by 2.2 percentage points. Given the reduced form of the
estimates, it is hard to interpret this effect. First, self-employment may
proxy for income volatility. But as is noted by Skinner (1988), households
in risky categories may have chosen self-employment because they are less
risk-averse, in which case their propensity to insure may not be higher than
that of the average household. Second, for the self-employed the potential
loss from casualty risk may be larger than for employees, and their incentive
to purchase insurance accordingly greater. Third, Gruber and Poterba (1994)
point out that self-employed individuals typically have limited access to
group insurance, so for them the load factor may be higher than for
employees. For this reason they may end up spending more or less on
insurance than employees, depending on the elasticity of the coinsurance
rate with respect to the load factor.
30 Finally, and most importantly, for the
30 Gruber and Poterba (1994) focus on health insurance. They find that insurance coverage rises
with education and marriage; higher income families are much more likely to be covered with
health insurance. They also report that the rate of private insurance coverage among self-19
self-employed the assumption that shocks to income are independent of the
insurable loss is quite strong. A positive coefficient of self-employment may
therefore reflect a positive correlation between income risk and the potential
loss.
The correlation between preferences and employment choice and the fact
that the self-employed hold resources directly as well as through their
business suggest that a sample including the self-employed can lead to
inconsistent estimates. The second regression in Table 2 excludes 536 self-
employed and professionals leaving only the employed workers in the
sample. As argued, for this group the assumption that income risk and
property risk are independent is more reasonable.
With respect to the full sample estimates, the effect of income risk on the
insurance decision is larger: for instance, the average derivative reported in
Table 2 is 0.48 for the employees vis-à-vis 0.22 in the full sample. If income
risk and property risk are positively correlated for the self-employed but
independent for the employees, then, ceteris paribus, the effect of income
risk should be smaller for the employees. However, as mentioned,
employees may be more risk-averse than the self-employed, implying a
larger effect in the restricted sample. The estimates suggest that the latter
effect dominates the former. We regard this as an interesting result;
indirectly, it supports the claim that, given the correlation between
occupation and risk aversion, self-employment is a poor proxy for income
risk.
Next we use information on insurance amounts to see how they vary with
household characteristics. Because of the censoring of the dependent
variable, in Table 3 we report Tobit estimates of the demand for insurance.
The sign pattern and statistical significance match those of the probit
estimates. Other things being equal, increasing the expected income
variance from 1 to 5 million lire (about two standard deviations above the
mean) increases casualty insurance premiums by 0.057 million lire, about
80 percent of the sample mean. This represents the combined effect of
income risk on the fraction of those choosing to purchase insurance and on
the amount demanded by those already purchasing insurance. The effect of
                                                                                                                  
employed persons is lower than among the employed: in the Current Population Survey, the rate
of coverage is 85 and 73 percent, respectively. One explanation for this finding is that the self-
employed have limited access to group insurance. Their reasoning applies to our case to the extent
that group insurance is available also for casualty insurance.20
income risk excluding the self-employed is again larger than in the full
sample estimates.
Our regressions control explicitly for the level of households’ resources.
However, one could argue that theory suggests that the proper dependent
variable is premiums per unit of risk, not absolute amount of premiums as in
our Tobit specification. To address this issue we check the sensitivity of the
results using casualty insurance premiums divided by total household
resources as the dependent variable. If the size of risk is proportional to
wealth (as for instance in the case of home fire insurance) the share of
premiums in total wealth should in fact be a good proxy of the demand for
insurance per unit of risk. The right-hand-side variables (income and
background risk) are also scaled by total resources. The results (not reported
for brevity) are similar to those shown in Table 3. Income risk raises the
demand for insurance per unit of risk (a coefficient of 0.15 with a standard
error of 0.008), while income risk interacted with household resources has a
negative effect (a coefficient of -0.0014 with a standard error of 0.0003).
Evaluated at sample means, an increase in income risk of 1 percent of total
resources raises the demand for insurance (per unit of risk) by 1 percent.
Tobit estimates are restrictive because the effects of the regressors on the
insurance decision (the probits) and amount are constrained to be
proportional. In Table 4 we present Heckman's two-stage estimator of the
Tobit model, which is free of the proportionality hypothesis. The sign of the
coefficients of the variance and of the interaction term are the same as in the
Tobit estimates. However, the estimates have poor standard errors.
31
Qualitatively, the results are the same if we replace the amount of premiums
by the ratio of premiums to households’ resources. This last set of results
suggests that the effect of income risk on the insurance decision is
substantial; the effect on amounts is positive, as predicted by the theory, but
poorly estimated, possibly reflecting small sample size.
Overall the results suggest that background uncertainty has a sizable
effect on the decision to purchase casualty insurance. Since one form of
insurance consists simply in engaging in less risky activities, people who
would be likely to buy more insurance - i.e. more risk-averse individuals -
would also tend to avoid income risk to begin with. If this self-selection
31  The second-stage results do not change if we introduce other variables - such as dummies for
income recipients, region or education - in the first-stage probit estimates.21
problem is empirically relevant, the true impact of background risk on
insurance demand is larger than what we find and our estimates provide
only a lower bound for the true effect.
Tobit estimates are restrictive because the effects of the regressors on the
insurance decision (the probits) and amount are constrained to be
proportional. In Table 4 we present Heckman's two-stage estimator of the
Tobit model, which is free of the proportionality hypothesis. The sign of the
coefficients of the variance and of the interaction term are the same as in the
Tobit estimates. However, the estimates have poor standard errors.
32 This
last set of results suggests that the effect of income risk on the insurance
decision is substantial; the effect on amounts is positive, as predicted by the
theory, but poorly estimated, possibly reflecting small sample size.
Overall the results suggest that background uncertainty has a sizable
effect on the decision to purchase casualty insurance. Since one form of
insurance consists simply in engaging in less risky activities, people who
would be likely to buy more insurance - i.e. more risk-averse individuals -
would also tend to avoid income risk to begin with. If this self-selection
problem is empirically relevant, the true impact of background risk on
insurance demand is larger than what we find and our estimates provide
only a lower bound for the true effect.
5  Conclusions
Individuals face multiple sources of uncertainty: some can be partially
dealt with in insurance markets, others must be fully borne. As shown by
Kimball (1993), even when these two types of risks are statistically
independent they are likely to aggravate one another. Prudent individuals
will then take actions aimed at reducing their exposure to avoidable risks in
response to increases in unavoidable risks. In this paper we use the 1989
Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth to test some of the
implications of the theory of insurance under multiple sources of risk.
32 The second-stage results do not change if we introduce other variables - such as dummies for
income recipients, region or education - in the first-stage probit estimates.22
We relate the demand for casualty insurance to a self-reported measure of
income risk. The findings suggest that insurance demand is positively
affected by uninsurable income risk. The results are especially strong for
insurance decisions, weaker for insurance amounts. In the group with
relatively low expected income variance the average predicted probability of
purchasing insurance is 13.2 percent; the probability increases to 19.4
percent for the group with relatively high expected variance. It is also found
that the effect of income risk on the insurance decision falls as the level of
households resources rises.
The results are consistent with the argument that an increase in
unavoidable uncertainty induces risk-averse households to increase
coverage against the risks that can be avoided. The sensitivity of insurance
demand to changes in background uncertainty places restrictions on decision
makers’ preferences which involve higher order derivatives of the utility
function. In particular, the findings support decreasing (and possibly
convex) absolute prudence and risk aversion.
Our results might have implications for the cyclical behavior of insurance
premiums (Gron and Lucas, 1995): if income uncertainty varies over the
business cycle this alone can induce insurance cycles. Furthermore, policies
that change the amount of background risk - such as unemployment
compensation or wage indexation - may impact on the demand for
insurance; this suggests that the wide international differences in the
development of insurance markets might be partly due to differences in the
amount of background uncertainty faced by each country’s citizens.
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APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
Household size Total number of persons in the family. Persons include
head, spouse (whether formally married or not), children, other relatives
and non-relatives living in the household. The variable "number of
children" includes dependent children only.
Education The survey responses are coded as: 0 (no education), 5
(completed elementary school), 8 (completed junior high school), 13
(completed high school), 18 (completed university degree), 20
(postgraduate education).
Occupation Coded as: (1) operative or labourer; (2) clerical; (3)
professional, manager or entrepreneur; (4) self-employed.
Sector of occupation Coded as: (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3)
services, (4) public administration.
Disposable income Sum of wages and salaries, self-employment
income and income from financial and real assets, less income taxes and
social security contributions. Wages and salaries include overtime
bonuses, fringe benefits and payments in kind, and exclude withholding
taxes. Self-employment income is net of taxes and includes income from
unincorporated business, net of depreciation of physical assets.
Net worth Sum of household's net financial assets and real assets. Real
assets are the sum of real estate, unincorporate business holdings and
durable goods (appliances, home furnishing and valuables). Net financial
assets are imputed from the flow of financial income (interest on
checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, certificates
of deposit, stocks, Government bonds and other bonds plus dividends,
less interest on household liabilities). We estimate an average after-tax
interest rate by weighting the after-tax interest on deposits, government
bonds, currency and other financial assets by their shares in the financial
accounts data. The estimated average after-tax interest rate is 8.29.26
THE MEASURE OF UNCERTAINTY
In the 1989 SHIW the following two questions were asked to each labor
income or pension recipient.
Inflation uncertainty On this table we have indicated some classes of
inflation. We are interested in knowing your opinion about inflation twelve
months from now. Suppose that you have 100 points to be distributed
Between these intervals (a table is shown to the person interviewed). Are
there intervals which you definitely exclude? Assign zero points to these
intervals. How many points do you assign to each of the remaining
intervals?
For this and the following question the intervals of the table shown to the
person interviewed are the same. The intervals are: >25 percent; 15-20: 13-
15; 10-13; 8-10; 7-8; 6-7; 5-6; 3-5; 0-3, less than 0. In case it is less than
zero, the person is asked: How much less than zero? How many points
would you assign to this class?
Earnings uncertainty We are also interested in knowing your opinion
about (your) labor earnings or pensions twelve months from now. Suppose
that you have 100 points to be distributed between these intervals (a table is
shown to the person interviewed). Are there intervals which you definitely
exclude? Assign zero points to these intervals. How many points do you
assign to each of the remaining intervals?27
TABLE 1
INSURANCE PREMIUMS BY ECONOMIC STATUS AND DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSEHOLD (1989 SHIW)
Variable Total sample Selected sample No insurance Casualty
insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 51.34 49.23 49.38 48.25
Married 0.70 0.80 0.79 0.83
Number of children under 18 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.68
Education 8.47 9.53 9.32 10.93
Self-employed 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.31
Households resources 169.94 186.31 164.42 330.95
Expected earnings -- 30.41 28.66 41.97
Resident in the North 0.41 0.47 0.43 0.77
Resident in the Center 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.13
Resident in the South 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.10
City < 25,000 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.12
25,000 < City > 250,000 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.48
250,000 < City <1,000,000 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.17
City > 1,000,000 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.22
Subjective income variance -- 0.58 0.51 1.05
Casualty insurance > 0 0.10 0.13 0.00 1.00
Amount of Casualty
insurance
0.05 0.07 0.00 0.54
Observations 8,274 4,078 3,542 536
Note. Resources, earnings, casualty insurance and the subjective income variance are expressed in
million of 1989 lire.28
TABLE 2
THE EFFECT OF INCOME RISK ON THE INSURANCE DECISION.
PROBIT ESTIMATES







Age 0.069 4.28 -0.01 0.062 3.35 -0.01
Age
2 -0.720E-3 -4.45 -- -0.645E-3 -3.50 --
Married -0.046 -0.59 -0.82 -0.151 -1.67 -2.65
Number of children 0.038 1.05 0.50 0.056 1.31 0.65
Education 0.024 3.45 0.30 0.018 2.21 0.21
Self-employed 0.138 2.03 2.26 -- -- --
Household resources 0.001 8.64 0.01 0.001 7.68 0.02
Expected earnings 0.007 4.44 0.09 0.009 4.13 0.10
Resident in the North 0.495 6.38 6.78 0.537 5.84 6.56
Resident in the South -0.538 -5.54 -11.78 -0.513 -4.37 -10.53
25,000 < City > 250,000 0.266 2.25 4.10 0.274 2.68 5.86
250,000 < City <1,000,000 0.477 3.05 6.59 0.381 3.04 5.07
City > 1,000,000 0.462 4.54 6.44 0.459 3.88 3.86
Income variance 0.035 2.25 0.22 0.062 2.78 0.48
Income variance * resources -0.064E-3 -2.46 -- -0.092E-3 -2.13 --




Note. Marginal probabilities are computed as follows. For continuous variables we evaluate the partial
derivative of the probit function, (Xikk)(Xikk/Xik), where i=1, ...N denotes the households in the sample, k
the estimated coefficient and  the density function of the normal distribution. We then take the sample
average of this derivative. For indicator variables, we predict the probability of purchasing insurance if the
dummy is equal to one and if the dummy is equal to zero, and take the average difference of these
predictions across households.29
TABLE 3
THE EFFECT OF INCOME RISK ON INSURANCE AMOUNTS. TOBIT
ESTIMATES
Total sample Excluding self-employed
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age 0.068 4.22 0.042 3.02
Age
2 -0.721E-3 -4.45 -0.45E-3 -3.25
Married -0.061 -0.80 -0.156 -2.32
Number of children 0.016 0.44 0.027 0.84
Education 0.015 2.21 0.010 1.68
Self-employed 0.237 3.67 -- --
Household resources 0.001 10.20 0.001 8.42
Expected earnings 0.009 5.49 0.008 4.90
Resident in the North 0.439 5.65 0.362 5.15
Resident in the South -0.500 -5.14 -0.351 -3.95
25,000 < City > 250,000 0.343 3.95 0.250 3.25
250,000 < City <1,000,000 0.465 4.43 0.277 2.92
City > 1,000,000 0.400 3.94 0.288 3.19
Income variance 0.030 1.90 0.045 2.26
Income variance * resources -0.074E-3 -2.71 -0.084E-3 -1.86





THE EFFECT OF INCOME RISK ON INSURANCE AMOUNTS.
GENERALIZED TOBIT ESTIMATES
Total sample Excluding self-employed
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age 0.046 1.39 0.012 0.33
Age
2 -0.500E-3 -1.46 -0.174E-3 -0.44
Married -0.059 -0.70 -0.179 -1.69
Number of children -0.017 -0.42 -0.001 -0.21
Education -0.003 -0.31 0.001 0.03
Self-employed 0.369 4.24 -- --
Household resources 0.001 2.64 0.001 1.24
Expected earnings 0.008 3.07 0.007 1.61
Resident in the North 0.248 1.23 0.176 0.58
Resident in the South -0.229 -0.91 -0.056 -0.17
25,000 < City > 250,000 0.407 2.93 0.286 1.76
250,000 < City <1,000,000 0.302 1.43 0.202 0.93
City > 1,000,000 0.206 1.00 0.145 0.57
Income variance 0.019 0.81 0.040 1.11
Income variance * resources -0.070E-3 -1.85 -0.116E-3 -1.96




Note. Standard errors are corrected for two-stage estimation.31
FIGURE 1
THE EFFECT OF BACKGROUND RISK ON THE OPTIMAL DEMAND
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